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ABSTRACT 
Identifying strategies to more broadly distribute the 
economic winnings of AI technologies is a growing priority 
in HCI and other fields. One idea gaining prominence 
centers on “data dividends”, or sharing the profits of AI 
technologies with the people who generated the data on 
which these technologies rely. Despite the rapidly growing 
discussion around data dividends – including backing by 
prominent politicians – there exists little guidance about 
how data dividends might be designed and little information 
about if they will work. In this paper, we begin the process 
of developing a concrete design space for data dividends. 
We additionally simulate the effects of a variety of 
important design decisions using well-known datasets and 
algorithms. We find that seemingly innocuous decisions can 
create counterproductive effects, e.g. severely concentrated 
dividends and demographic disparities. Overall, the 
outcomes we observe – both desirable and undesirable – 
highlight the need for dividend implementers to make 
design decisions cautiously. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing belief in economics that intelligent 
technologies are contributing to rising economic inequality 
[9, 10, 45, 63]. There is also substantial concern that this 
trend will accelerate as intelligent technologies become 
more capable [6, 16]. Critically, economic inequality is not 
an isolated phenomenon: it has been linked to political 
instability [3, 77], reduced national economic growth [69], 
financial crises [3, 8, 17], and even health outcomes [17], 
among other major societal challenges.   
Given the exceptional stakes of large-scale economic 
inequality and computing’s potential role in exacerbating 
this inequality, there have been growing calls in computing 
to much more seriously engage with our field’s potential 
economic harms. Within the human-computer interaction 
community, mitigating computing’s effect on economic 
inequality has been proposed as the “HCI problem of our 
time” [13, 27]. Within artificial intelligence, this topic is 
being cited as a top research challenge for the field (e.g. 
[2]). 
In the many discussions about how to create a computing 
field that more broadly distributes its economic winnings, 
one idea has rapidly grown in prominence: giving people 
data dividends. While there is no commonly-agreed-upon 
definition of data dividends, the idea generally refers to 
giving users a share of the profits from an intelligent 
technology when their data contributions have been used to 
train that technology (e.g. [6, 27, 32, 42, 44, 50, 57, 73]). 
This approach is motivated by the fact that the intelligent 
technologies implicated in exacerbating inequality are 
highly dependent on data contributions from their users.  
Payment for data has been well-studied in HCI through the 
lens of crowdwork. However, data dividends are both 
distinct from and complementary to existing crowdwork 
approaches. Key potential benefits of implementing data 
dividends as part of a broader solution set (that could 
incorporate crowdwork) include the ability to reward 
people for their implicit behavioral data and past data 
contributions. In addition, data dividends may help address 
concerns related to the working conditions of crowdworkers 
[24, 33, 64]. 
Interest in data dividends has grown enough that politicians 
are beginning to call for them: the governor of California 
proposed a state-wide data dividend in a major policy 
speech [72] and similar conversations are occurring in other 
jurisdictions [48]. However, despite their prominence, we 
have little understanding of the design space for data 
dividends and the challenging choices entities who want to 
implement data dividends must make. For instance, to 
which technologies would data dividends apply and to 
whom should dividends be given? Should the dividend be 
the same for everyone, or – as much of the discussion thus 
far suggests – should each contributor’s dividend be 
“meritocratic”, a function of the impact of that person’s 
data on AI performance? 
In concert with our limited understanding of the design 
space of data dividends, we also have very little information 
about the impacts of specific design choices. Critically, it 
could be that certain choices lead to data dividends that are 
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concentrated among a small group, potentially even 
exacerbating inequality and contravening the purpose of 
data dividends. Given the HCI and social computing 
literature on the highly unequal nature of data contributions 
to many online social systems, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that this antithetical outcome is a serious risk. 
The goal of this paper is to start the process of developing 
an empirically-grounded decision framework for 
implementers of data dividends. We contribute to this 
process in two ways: (1) we concretize key aspects of the 
data dividends design space and (2) we explore this design 
space in a large series of simulations. With regard to the 
former, drawing from the ongoing discussions and our own 
experience implementing simulations, we find that the 
design space is more complex than early discussions 
suggest and highlight fruitful opportunities for future work. 
With regard to our simulations, we focus on simulating 
choices in the design space that are both prominent in 
discussions and feasible to simulate. We use multiple well-
known machine learning (ML) approaches - logistic 
regression, support vector machines, and neural networks - 
and ten datasets that cover different domains and user-to-
observation cardinalities (whether a user can contribute one 
or many observations). 
At the highest level, our results emphasize that it will be 
absolutely critical to carefully weigh and simulate design 
decisions to ensure that data dividends will not do more 
harm than good. In particular, our findings raise concerns 
that the commonly-discussed “meritocratic” approach to 
data dividends could have unexpected and economically 
undesirable outcomes, e.g. dividends that are much more 
unequal than the United States income distribution. We also 
find that design choices that lead to highly concentrated 
dividends can also create serious disparities along 
demographic lines that correspond to legally protected 
classes, e.g. sex and race [71]. For instance, we observe 
many cases in which one demographic group receives less 
than 80% the median dividend of another. 
Below, we begin with an overview of work that motivated 
our investigation, followed by an articulation of our design 
space research and our simulation research. We close by 
discussing implications, limitations, and future work. 
Before continuing, however, it is important to note that our 
goal is not to make an argument for whether the winnings 
of intelligent technologies should be distributed more 
widely through data dividends; for this, we refer readers to 
ongoing discussions in both the academic literature and 
popular media (e.g. [6, 27, 32, 42, 44, 50, 57, 73]). Our aim 
is to inform the growing data dividend discussion with 
concretization and empirical information from simulations. 
More generally, this paper is motivated by an argument that 
has been expressed strongly in the HCI community: the 
potentially tremendous stakes of computing’s relationship 
to economic inequality demand that our field explore long-
term plans to change this relationship [13, 27]. 
RELATED WORK 
Background on Data Dividends 
Critical to the stakes of the data dividends discussion is the 
growing support for data dividends from political leaders 
and the media. Most notably, the governor of California 
announced interest in implementing a data dividend in a 
major policy speech [72]. Similarly, many high profile 
media outlets have begun to cover data dividends and 
related concepts (e.g. [21, 56, 72, 80]). 
There is also a growing body of literature that has 
advocated for data dividends and related approaches as a 
potential way to address computing-induced economic 
inequality. Posner and Weyl argued that providing 
payments for data, catalyzed by “data unions”, could be a 
critical step towards addressing economic inequalities [57]. 
Arrieta Ibarra and colleagues introduced a theoretical 
framework that calls thinking of “data as labor” and 
rethinking the current paradigm in which data is treated as 
“exhaust” that companies collect; this framework directly 
supports the arguments underlying data dividends [6]. 
While data dividend discussions have recently grown in 
momentum, related ideas date back to the late 1990s, when 
a variety of micropayment schemes were proposed to pay 
for Internet content [61, 68]. Lanier has described a similar 
micropayment economy for the modern Internet [44]. 
Changing regulations around data also potentially pave the 
way for easier implementation of data dividends. Recently, 
the EU (e.g. GDPR) and California (e.g. CCPA) have 
begun to regulate data privacy [38, 46]. Legal standards 
around how data is handled and increased public attention 
to data’s value may serve as stepping stones for data 
dividend-related policies. 
Relationship to Crowdwork Marketplaces 
A substantial literature in HCI and related fields has 
emerged around crowdwork marketplaces such as 
Mechanical Turk (e.g.  [4, 24, 29, 36, 37, 39]). While 
crowdwork marketplaces are well-studied, one reason data 
dividends have grown in prominence is that they 
complement the crowdwork approach in important ways. 
First, existing crowdwork marketplaces are not equipped to 
reward people for the data they produce during 
consumptive activities, i.e. “prosumption” [58]. Many 
profitable intelligent technologies (e.g. recommender 
systems and search engines) rely on prosumption for 
valuable behavioral data, e.g. what movies users watch and 
what links people click. Additionally, existing crowdwork 
marketplaces are transactional: workers are paid per 
contribution. This means existing crowdwork marketplaces 
are not well-suited to rewarding historical contributions, 
and thus cannot be used to share the profits of technologies 
invented in the years before any broad profit sharing 
approaches could be implemented. If computing-induced 
inequality increases dramatically, simply distributing 
earnings from future improvements to technologies will 
likely be insufficient to satiate economic and likely political 
demands. Finally, current crowdwork marketplaces have 
been subject to a broad range of critiques related to their 
suitability to addressing economic inequality, e.g. charges 
of excessively low wages [24] and terrible working 
conditions [33, 64]. By taking a much different approach, 
data dividends may be able to address some of these issues. 
There is active work seeking to address some of the above 
issues, especially those related to wages and working 
conditions, and our expectation is that crowdwork could be 
an important part of broadly distributing the profits from 
intelligent technologies. While this paper focuses on non-
crowdwork data dividends, below we further discuss how 
these ideas and literatures can benefit from each other. 
Data Valuation: What is Data Worth? 
A central challenge for data dividends is identifying the 
value of data. Our work intersects with this broad challenge 
at multiple levels, with two of particular note: (1) company-
level data valuation, which is concerned with how much 
data is worth in aggregate to a company, and (2) 
observation-level data valuation, which is concerned with 
how much data is worth to a machine learning model.  
Company-level data valuation is a subject of recent work 
[19, 23, 43, 47, 66], which has estimated the aggregate 
monetary value of data (e.g. using revenue from digital 
advertising). Notably, a study from Shapiro and Anejo 
called for 50% of estimated “data revenue” to be paid 
directly to Americans or into infrastructure [66]. While this 
recent company-level data valuation work provides a 
starting point for data dividends, future exploration will be 
needed. In particular, identifying the value of intelligent 
technologies not directly connected to revenue (e.g. 
services like AI assistants, search, image tagging, etc.) and 
public datasets on which for-profit intelligent technologies 
rely (e.g. Wikipedia [50, 74]) will be important for a more 
holistic implementation of data dividends. 
As mentioned above, most discussions of data dividends 
have suggested (often implicitly) that dividends should be 
paid out in accordance with how much somebody 
individually impacted an intelligent technology. This 
“meritocratic” approach to data dividends requires some 
form of observation-level data valuation - a way to measure 
the value of data to a ML model – which is an open 
challenge that has been explored by recent ML research 
[22, 35, 40].  
We focus on the influence function approach from Koh and 
Liang’s work [40], which operationalizes meritocratic data 
valuation by estimating how model loss changes when an 
observation is removed. Using influence functions, 
introduced by Cook and Weisberg in the 1970s  [14, 15], 
Koh and Liang showed that leave-one-out (LOO) loss 
change can be estimated without retraining a model and 
released open-source software to do so. 
The ability to avoid retraining is absolutely critical for 
meritocratic data dividend simulations: retraining a model 
for every unit of training data – as is required for LOO 
evaluation – is computationally intractable, especially for 
complex models and large datasets. As such, influence 
functions were crucial to making our data dividend 
simulations computationally possible. 
That said, while influence functions have rapidly come into 
wide use since Koh and Liang’s work just two years ago, 
influence functions were evaluated by examining especially 
influential training data and misclassified test data. The data 
dividends context requires a different view, in particular 
one that considers all observations in a dataset.  
To ensure that Koh and Liang’s technique is sufficiently 
effective when adopting this broader view, we replicated 
and extended Koh and Liang’s investigation of influence 
accuracy across entire datasets. As discussed in our 
simulation results section, while we found that influence 
functions were accurate for most data dividend needs, we 
also identified some potential weaknesses in influence 
functions. Despite this caveat, influence functions represent 
the only currently well-known approach for 
computationally feasible observation-level data valuation, 
which is required to simulate the prominently-discussed 
meritocratic approach to data dividends. We expand on 
potential extensions and alternatives to influence functions 
in Discussion. 
DESIGN SPACE 
Below, we first describe how we identified dimensions in 
the data dividend design space. Next, we describe each 
dimension and how we selected prominent and feasible 
choices within each dimension to explore via simulations.  
Identifying Dimensions of the Design Space 
A critical challenge in advancing the discussion about data 
dividends is that, despite the prominence of this discussion, 
the design space for data dividends has not been explored. 
To address this challenge, we followed the approach used 
by Quinn and Bederson in 2011 to map the design space of 
human computation [59], which entailed using existing 
literature to identify dimensions of the design space. While 
data dividends are not nearly as well-studied as human 
computation was in 2011, we were able to draw from 
scientific literature, ongoing discussions in the media, and 
conversations with a group of scholars interested in this 
issue to identify important design dimensions. 
Communicating these dimensions – and the various choices 
that lie along them – requires the adoption of consistent 
terminology, which is also lacking in the nascent data 
dividends discussion. Here, we utilize the following 
nomenclature as it is well-suited at least to articulating our 
identified design dimensions: we refer to people who 
contribute observations (units of data) as contributors. 
Observations are organized in datasets, which are used to 
train models that perform some task (e.g. “classify spam 
emails”) that plays a role in some intelligent technology. 
Very generally, a data dividend implementation is a scheme 
that takes a share of the economic winnings of one or more 
intelligent technologies and distributes these winnings to 
contributors in some manner.  
Below, we introduce and describe the six dimensions we 
identified: Funding, Implementer, Tasks, Time Period, 
Disbursement, and Observation Valuation. 
1 – The Funding Dimension 
The Funding dimension considers how data dividends will 
be funded. One approach might be taxing revenue that is 
attributable to intelligent technologies. As highlighted in 
Related Work, some work on company-level data valuation 
has estimated the monetary value of data [19, 23, 43, 47, 
66], but there are still challenges with such estimations. As 
such, alternatives might involve charging companies per 
unit of data they use (perhaps with price corresponding to 
the privacy implications of the data) or imposing a tax on 
"tech” companies (although company classification could 
prove challenging) [76]. 
In our simulations we do not assume any particular Funding 
design choice. To make our simulations feasible, we focus 
on analyzing results in terms of what fraction of the total 
funding each contributor would receive under any funding 
choice, i.e. the fractional distribution of dividends. This is 
possible because Funding is decoupled from the other 
dimensions – it only controls how the money for data 
dividends is collected, not how it is distributed.  
2 – The Implementer Dimension 
The Implementer dimension is concerned with which entity 
will actualize data dividends. One of the most prominent 
advocates for data dividends is the governor of California, 
suggesting government as a realistic implementer [72]. 
However, another possibility might be that tech companies 
themselves implement dividends. Alternatively, 
organizations analogous to labor unions could mediate 
interactions between data contributors and tech companies 
and thereby implement some form of data dividend [45]. 
Critically, different implementers will have different levels 
of data access. For instance, the California government 
may not be able to access every observation and model used 
by a tech company, and thus may be unable to implement 
certain types of data dividends.  
In our simulations, we focus on an Implementer that has full 
data access, though we also consider simple approaches that 
do not require data access (such approaches are easier to 
simulate due to their necessary simplicity). Future work 
might further explore data dividends that only require 
partial data access. 
3 - The Tasks Dimension 
The Tasks dimension determines which tasks performed by 
intelligent technologies should be considered in 
implementing data dividends. The choice will determine for 
which datasets implementers must account. As data 
dividends discussions have included a variety of Tasks, we 
sought to cover a variety of task domains in our 
simulations, focusing on simple classification tasks and 
datasets to keep our early-stage simulations feasible. 
Every dataset has a contributor-to-observation cardinality. 
Datasets that have only a single observation per contributor 
have a one-to-one cardinality. Any dataset in which each 
observation describes one person fits this category, e.g. a 
dataset describing medical or financial status of individuals. 
Many datasets have one-to-many cardinalities, e.g. a 
product review dataset in which users can review many 
products. Depending on the definition and scope of a single 
observation, it is possible to have many-to-many 
cardinality. For instance, a set of Wikipedia articles written 
by a group of editors could be seen as many-to-many if each 
article corresponds to a single observation. In our 
simulations we focus on the more commonly-available one-
to-one and one-to-many datasets. 
A critical concern relating to cardinality is that one-to-many 
or many-to-many cardinality datasets allow for large 
disparities in contribution, and thus dividends might reflect 
these disparities and could exacerbate inequality (because a 
small group of people get the majority of the dividends). 
For instance, the social computing literature has identified 
that a small group of people contribute a large percentage of 
the content (i.e. data) on Wikipedia, YouTube, and other 
social computing platforms [11, 25, 28, 53]). These 
contribution patterns may be a serious concern for data 
dividends, so we were careful to ensure our simulations 
included some one-to-many datasets. 
4 - The Time Period Dimension 
This dimension considers the Time Period in which 
observations will be considered for a data dividend. This 
seemingly minor consideration has enormous implications 
for both designers and beneficiaries of data dividends. If the 
time period covers the past, dividends will have the 
backward-looking property and can reward people for data 
that has already been contributed. The possibility of 
backward-looking data dividends is a key motivation for 
data dividends, as they can reward people for the data 
contributed in the years before broad distributing of 
economic winnings is implemented. The Time Period can 
also include the future, giving dividends the forward-
looking property. If data dividends are forward-looking, 
they can reward future contributions and incentivize the 
collection of new data (similar to crowdwork). 
Given the political importance of backward-looking 
dividends and the need for additional work on the effects of 
incentives, we focus on backward-looking Time Periods in 
our simulations. Below, we discuss how future work might 
further explore forward-looking dividends. 
5 - The Disbursement Dimension 
This dimension determines how the winnings of intelligent 
technologies will be disbursed. One way that different 
Disbursement choices can be categorized is by their 
granularity, ranging from extremely granular, e.g. every 
contributor receives a customized paycheck, to very low 
granularity, e.g. funds are pooled together and used for 
public projects like infrastructure or education [66]. 
Notably, low granularity approaches that do not attempt to 
customize dividends at an individual-level obviate the need 
for navigating the Observation Valuation dimension. As we 
will see, some of our results suggest this might be desirable. 
Beyond differences in granularity, Disbursement choices 
can also differ in other ways, e.g. which specific initiatives 
low granularity dividends might fund.  
In our simulations, we assume individual-level 
Disbursement in which each contributor receives money, as 
this idea is most prominent in data dividend discussions. 
6 - The Observation Valuation Dimension 
The Observation Valuation dimension is concerned with 
measuring the value of observations to machine learning 
models, i.e. it addresses the observation-level data valuation 
challenge introduced in Related Work. This design 
dimension is highly complex in terms of the number of 
possibilities available to designers, the need to consider the 
technical details of machine learning models and, as we will 
see below, impact on the outcome of data dividends (and 
critically, influence whether data dividends will achieve 
their economic goals).  
Individual-oriented “meritocratic” Observation Valuation 
has appeared prominently in discussions of data dividends 
[6, 57] and even machine learning literature [22, 35]. This 
approach entails assigning dividends based on estimates of 
the effect of individual observations on machine learning 
models. In theory, such estimation could involve a variety 
of evaluation procedures (e.g. LOO, Shapley value, leaving 
out an observation alongside other observations) and 
performance metrics (e.g. loss, accuracy, precision). One 
feasible meritocratic approach that has appeared in data 
dividend discussions involves examining how a machine 
learning implementation’s “loss function” changes when 
leaving out individual observations. Loss functions are 
central to how machine learning algorithms operate: for a 
given machine learning implementation, a chosen loss 
function is the mathematical function that a machine 
learning algorithm seeks to minimize (lower loss means 
better performance). Given that influence functions make 
this approach much more feasible than alternatives, this is 
the approach we take in our simulations. 
Another option for meritocratic evaluation is to sum the 
effects of all observations from each contributor, so that 
each contributor has a “summed influence”. Influence can 
be positive or negative, so summed influence will not 
necessarily correlate with the number of observations 
contributed. As we will see in our results, this approach 
could mitigate serious concerns around contribution 
disparities leading to highly unequal data dividends.  
Two approaches to Observation Valuation that do not 
require an Implementer with access to underlying machine 
learning models would be to simply assign the same 
dividend to each observation (such that a contributor’s 
dividend is determined by their number of contributions) or 
to each contributor (such that observations beyond the first 
provide no additional value to a contributor). Variations 
might assign extra value to observations of a certain class 
that are externally visible (e.g. rare medical cases) or to 
contributors of an observable type (e.g. people living in 
rural areas). These straightforward approaches may be 
desirable, as they will have a low cost compared to 
approaches that require access to underlying models. 
Transforming Observation Value to Money 
Individual-level Disbursement requires assigning each 
contributor a dividend, i.e. a fraction of the money 
determined by choices from the Funding dimension. This 
necessitates an open-ended and important Observation 
Valuation challenge: transforming value measurements 
(e.g. LOO loss change) into dividends (i.e. money). In 
theory, implementers can choose from a wide variety of 
mathematical functions to achieve this. In our work, we 
sought to explore the most straightforward of these 
functions with the goal of simulating how data dividends 
might be first implemented.  
Specifically, we focus on four simple transforms that 
capture a variety of perspectives on data valuation. We 
assume that early data dividends would not allow for “data 
debt” and thus any transform must result in non-negative 
dividends (we expand on this in Limitations). The first three 
simple transforms use functions which operate on 
continuous values: Shift, Absolute Value, and Clipping. The 
fourth transform, Binning, treats measurements as ordinal. 
Keeping with our goal of exploring straightforward 
approaches, we ensure that each transform assigns 
fractional dividend values to each contributor that 
collectively sum to one (because each dividend represents a 
fraction of total funds). Below we discuss each of these four 
transforms in more detail.  
Shift Transform: A basic approach to achieve non-negative 
dividends for all contributors would be using mathematical 
translation to shift the minimum measurement value to zero 
(i.e. subtract the minimum), and then scale the shifted 
values so that each contributor is assigned a fractional 
dividend value. This operationalizes a view in which an 
observation’s monetary value is linearly related to its 
marginal effect on model performance. 
Absolute Value Transform: In some cases, observations that 
are “hurtful” to a model may be useful to developers. As 
highlighted by Koh and Liang [40], “hurtful” points can 
help debug potential pitfalls like domain mismatch or 
wrongly-labeled data. One classic example of a constructive 
“hurtful” observation comes from the MNIST handwritten 
digits dataset: when classifying only “7” and “1” digits, a 
training observation “7” with an extra horizontal line (e.g. 
“7”) will “harm” the model’s ability to classify a “7” 
correctly (i.e. make it more likely the model classifies “7” 
as a “1) [40]. Developers can use this information to re-
evaluate the validity of their model or data.  
An absolute value approach can ensure that hurtful 
observations are rewarded alongside helpful observations. 
The basic implementation of this approach that we use 
involves taking the absolute value of each measurement and 
then following the Shift procedure.  
Clipping Transform: This transform treats reductions in 
model performance harshly by giving all hurtful data 
contributions zero value and then scaling to fractional 
dividend values. This might make sense if the organization 
is already confident that they have a very representative test 
set (i.e. there are no 7- like situations). 
Ordinal Binning Transform: An alternate family of 
straightforward initial transforms considers ordinal value 
measurement and assigns certain rewards to certain 
categorical bins. For instance, one Binning approach might 
give all observations with loss change above or equal to the 
median loss change twice the reward of those below the 
median, so that very helpful observations receive greater 
rewards. Variants might assign rewards based on quintile, 
decile, etc. Critically, Ordinal Binning provides a simple 
way of controlling the outcome of dividends and imposing 
a maximum degree of inequality. As we will see below, this 
may be desirable to reduce the impact of Observation 
Valuation noise on the dividend a contributor might 
receive. To explore a basic and interpretable example of 
binning we use the “above median gets 2x” approach 
described above in our simulations. 
SIMULATING DATA DIVIDENDS 
In this section, we describe the second major portion of 
work in this paper: our simulations of data dividend 
implementations. Whereas the design space in the previous 
section outlines a decision framework for dividend 
implementors, in this section we seek to provide 
empirically-informed guidance within that framework. As 
discussed above, we do not attempt to simulate all possible 
choices within the design space; doing so is not possible at 
this early stage of the literature. Instead, we sought to 
simulate choices that were both (1) particularly prominent 
in the growing discussion around data dividends and (2) 
feasible for simulation.  
Using these criteria of prominence and feasibility, we 
focused our simulations on the dimensions of Observation 
Valuation and Tasks. As discussed in Related Work, 
Observation Valuation is a central topic in the current data 
dividends debate, with interest being particularly high in 
“meritocratic” approaches. Thus, we do a deep dive into the 
transform component of Observation Valuation, which 
speaks to how a meritocratic implementation might work. 
For context, we also include the much more straightforward 
approach that simply apportions dividends based on a fix 
amount per observation. The data dividend discussions also 
consider a wide variety of Tasks (and thus datasets). As 
such, we sought to include tasks from a wide variety of 
domains. Ensuring diversity of Tasks has the added benefit 
of a degree of self-replication, ensuring our results are not 
specific to a single domain. A summary of the choices we 
made within each dimension is shown in Table 1. 
Our simulations all follow a similar structure. First, we 
implement an Observation Valuation approach. Next, we 
apply this approach across all of the Tasks we consider 
(which is made possible using influence functions). Finally, 
we examine for each approach and each task the effects on 
our core outcome metric: the equality of the resulting 
dividend distributions. With respect to this outcome metric, 
we consider both overall equality as well as, where 
possible, equality across demographic groups.  
Below we first describe our methodological approach in 
more detail, including the required validation of influence 
functions for the full training data distribution use case (as 
discussed above). We then unpack the results of our 
simulations with respect to the equality of dividends. 
Methods 
Machine Learning Tasks and Modeling Approaches 
We simulated data dividends for ten different classification 
Tasks and their corresponding datasets. The Tasks we used 
include classification tasks related to finance (Adult Income 
[41], German Credit [30], Bank Marketing [52], and Boston 
Housing [26]), medicine (Heart Disease [18], Breast Cancer 
[70]), text (Spam [51], Yelp sentiment [60], Amazon 
sentiment [5, 49]) and images (Fashion MNIST [78]). 
Training dataset size ranged from 242 to 420k. We note that 
many of the datasets we used are hosted through the UCI 
Machine Learning Repository (UCI MLR) and scikit-learn 
[55], both of which have been widely used in research and 
practice, i.e. these datasets have played an important role in 
the long-term development of intelligent technologies.   
Critically, the Yelp and Amazon tasks had one-to-many 
user-to-observation cardinality, so we were able to study 
the concerns around contribution disparities discussed 
above. Several datasets also included demographic data, 
which enabled our investigation of demographic disparities. 
 Dimension How Our Simulations Explore the Dimension 
Funding We make no assumptions about Funding. 
Implementer We assume the Implementer has data access. 
Tasks We include ten different tasks and three machine learning 
approaches. All tasks are simple classification tasks. 
Time Period We assume data dividends are strictly backward-looking. 
Disbursement We assume individual-level, “paycheck-style” 
Disbursement. 
Observation 
Valuation 
We consider multiple “meritocratic” approaches alongside 
a “fixed value per contributor” approach. We consider four 
different loss-to-dividend transformations that encode 
different understandings of data value. 
Table 1. Shows the data dividend design dimensions we 
identified and their relationships to our simulations. 
In order to better capture how ML is used in practice, we 
performed our simulations using multiple modeling 
approaches: logistic regression (LR), support vector 
machines (SVM), and convolutional neural networks 
(CNN) [40] (the same set of approaches that that Koh and 
Liang used to demonstrate the utility of influence 
functions). As the Fashion MNIST task was created 
specifically to challenge CNNs, and CNNs are substantially 
more expensive to train than LR or SVM, we applied the 
CNN architecture from Koh and Liang to this one task and 
applied the LR and SVM implementations from Koh and 
Liang to our nine other tasks. Furthermore, because CNN 
training is expensive, Koh and Liang estimated the change 
in loss when training a model (such that loss approaches a 
local minima), removing an observation, and then retraining 
the model (for 30k steps), as opposed to a full retrain. We 
also adopt this approach. For each task, we randomly 
withheld 20% of the data to use as a test dataset, which we 
used to evaluate model test loss (for Fashion MNIST, we 
usd the test dataset provided by the dataset’s creators). 
Data Dividend Outcome Metrics 
To compare the equality of data dividends implemented 
with different design choices, we focus on the Gini Index, a 
standard inequality metric from economics. The Gini index 
spans from 0 (total equality, everyone gets the same 
amount) to 100 (total inequality, one individual gets 
everything) [54]. While the exact impact of data dividends 
on overall inequality will depend on Funding choices and 
who receives data dividends, the Gini index allows us to 
compare how broadly each (simulated) implementation of 
data dividends shares the economic winnings of AI 
systems. To study the prevalence of demographic 
disparities, we look at the median dividend received by 
members of the demographic groups in our datasets. 
Validating Influence Functions for Data Dividends 
As noted above, a critical precursor to the evaluation of 
Observation Valuation design choices is the ability to 
accurately estimate the effect of each observation on model 
performance. Koh and Liang focused on evaluating how 
well influence functions could estimate the LOO loss 
change when considering the most influential training data 
and the test loss for a single misclassified test observation 
[40]. In these evaluations case, influence functions were 
very accurate, although slightly less so for SVM and CNN 
than for LR. 
However, our use of influence functions requires evaluating 
them with a different perspective: we must consider the full 
spectrum of training observations, including those that are 
not particularly influential. As such, we replicated and 
extended Koh and Liang’s accuracy evaluation for a 
random sample of 100 training observations per task and 
computed loss across a randomly sampled test set, rather 
than for a single misclassified test observation. 
Overall, our experiments replicated Koh and Liang’s 
finding that influence functions are accurate for estimating 
LOO loss, even for the broader data dividend use case. We 
observed that influence functions were most accurate for 
LR, moderately accurate for SVM, and less accurate for 
CNN. The average (across tasks) correlation was 0.93 for 
LR, 0.63 for SVM, and 0.24 for CNN (all individual 
correlations were statistically significant at p < 0.05). When 
we instead looked at the 50 most influential observations 
for the CNN model, the correlation was 0.79, further 
reinforcing the utility of influence functions for evaluating 
highly influential observations. 
In general, the lower correlation for CNN we observed 
suggests that influence functions may have weaknesses in 
some data dividend contexts. Regardless, influence 
functions represent the only feasible approach to 
performing this type of Observation Valuation for 
expensive models like CNNs. Implementers likely will need 
to run their own validations (following a version of our 
approach) and make a judgment as to what level of 
accuracy is acceptable. This may lead some Implementers 
to seek alternatives or modifications to influence functions. 
We discuss such approaches below. 
Results 
In this section, we explore the outcomes of the prominent 
and feasible design choices that we explored. 
Inequality of Data Dividends 
Figure 1 shows the Gini index of data dividends that 
correspond to loss-based Observation Valuation for each 
combination of task, model and loss-to-dividend transform. 
Figure 1 also shows Gini index for a fixed amount per 
observation approach for one-to-many cardinality datasets, 
shown below the black horizontal line (doing so for the 
one-to-one cardinality datasets necessarily has a Gini index 
of zero). The Binning transform shown in Figure 1 is the 
implementation from Section 3: observations with above-
median influence receive twice as much as below-median 
observations. Two baselines from real-world income 
distributions are also included as vertical dotted lines in 
Figure 1: the United States (red, at 39.1), Finland (blue, at 
25.9), the country in the OECD, an intergovernmental 
economic organization, with the lowest Gini index [54].  
Figure 1 displays several patterns that are highly 
informative regarding the distributions that arise from 
various choices within the Observation Valuation 
dimensions. First, focusing on the Shift transform (leftmost 
column) and the one-to-one tasks (above the black 
horizontal line), we see support for the notion that data 
dividends can result in highly equal distribution of 
winnings. Using Shift, across all tasks and models, we see 
low Gini index values, i.e. most contributors receive about 
the same dividend.  
However, widening our view of Figure 1 to include the 
middle two columns, we see that with Absolute Value or 
Clipping, dividends become much more unequal, with some 
Gini index values around 80 (about twice the Gini index of 
the U.S. income distribution). As a representative example, 
Figure 2 shows the log-scaled histograms of the loss change 
distribution (left) and transformed dividend distributions 
(middle and right) for the Adult Income task and LR model. 
We converted the dividends in this figure from fractional 
values to dollars by assuming a total funding pool of $36k 
(the total number of contributors). This makes the mean 
dividend $1 and differences easier to interpret. With the 
Shift approach there are no dominant observations, i.e. 
“superstars” [62], but through transforms, one can induce 
superstars, e.g. the small group of contributors shown on 
the right earning 25-50x the average dividend. 
Next, when looking at the one-to-many cardinality Yelp 
and Amazon tasks, we see high levels of inequality. In fact, 
for these tasks, the level of inequality for the Shift transform 
is nearly identical to the level of inequality for “fixed 
amount per observation”, i.e. contribution patterns are 
driving dividend disparities. Absolute Value or Clipping 
transforms make dividends more unequal. This suggests 
that loss-based Observation Valuation alone did not induce 
a diminishing margin return effect. 
However, we did observe one design choice described 
above that could address these contribution disparities: 
summing loss change by contributor. While the results 
shown in Figure 1 use observation-specific value 
measurement, an implementer might instead sum loss 
changes per contributor and apply a measurement-to-
dividend transform to this “summed loss”. Critically, 
because loss changes can be positive or negative, the 
summed loss of each contributor does not necessarily 
correlate with their number of contributions. We simulated 
this dividend approach for the Amazon and Yelp datasets. 
The highest Gini index using this approach with the Shift 
transform was 1.6, i.e. this design choice resulted in very 
equal dividends. 
Taken together, the variety of outcomes we observed 
highlights the importance of simulating various designs 
before implementation. A well-intentioned Observation 
Valuation choice like using an Absolute Value loss-to-
dividend transform could lead to undesirable outcomes.  
Demographic Disparities in Data Dividends 
To investigate data dividends with a demographic lens, we 
used the simulated dividends from our three tasks with 
demographic features that correspond to protected classes. 
The Heart Disease and German Credit datasets use age and 
sex, and the Adult Income dataset uses age, sex, and race. 
We use the dividends from our LR models, for which 
influence functions are most accurate. 
To explore the prevalence of demographic disparities in our 
data dividends, we looked at the median payment received 
by contributors within each demographic group. For age, 
we grouped contributors into “under 40” or “40+”, based on 
how age is defined as a protected class in U.S. law [71]. For 
sex and race, we used the groups afforded by our datasets 
(male/female and U.S. Census racial categories). We 
computed “median dividend ratios” for each pairwise 
Figure 1. Gini index for data dividends across tasks and models. A lower Gini index means more equality. Colors distinguish 
different models. Each row shows a different task. Dotted lines show country-level 2016 income Gini indices. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Left: Histogram of loss changes for Adult Income 
dataset and logistic regression. Middle and Right: 
Corresponding dividends for Shift, Absolute Value and 
Clipping transforms, shown in dollars for a total Funding 
pool of $36k, the total number of contributors (i.e. so the 
mean dividend is $1). Counts are shown on a log scale. 
combinations within each set of groups, e.g. comparing the 
median dividend for “40+” and “under 40” contributors. 
We computed each ratio by dividing the smaller value of 
each pair by the larger value, so that each ratio was 
fractional (or one). 
We investigated the prevalence of disparities with a 
heuristic: does one group have less than 80% the median 
dividend of another group? This heuristic was loosely 
inspired by the “80% rule” from U.S. Labor Law [12], used 
in the past to define disparate impact in terms of employer 
hiring decisions. Machine learning fairness researchers 
have adapted this rule to identify disparate impacts in terms 
of classification of false positives [20, 79].  
We observed that for each set of demographic groups 
within each dataset, there was at least one transform for 
which one group received less than 80% the median 
dividend of another group. Moreover, the average 
disparities in median dividend were very large: the average 
median dividend ratio of medians was 0.24 for Clipping, 
0.56 for Absolute Value, 0.7 for Binning, and 1.0 for Shift. 
In other words, every transform except Shift led to 
meaningful demographic disparities. For example, when 
applying the Absolute Value transform to the Adult Income 
task, the median dividend for a man was 2.5x that of a 
woman. For Absolute Value applied to the German Credit 
dataset, people under 40 received 1.5x the median dividend 
of those over 40. 
DISCUSSION 
Our results indicate that the data dividend design space is 
much more complex than early discussions might suggest, 
and that certain design choices can lead to unintended 
outcomes. These findings mean it will be important to 
simulate the outcomes of any data dividend implementation 
before execution to avoid potentially counterproductive and 
harmful effects like increased inequality or disparate 
impacts across demographic lines. Put simply, data 
dividends need to be implemented with great caution if they 
are to achieve their stated goals. Below, we discuss some 
implications of this overall result.  
Customizing Outcomes of Data Dividends 
While we approached our simulations from the standpoint 
of a data dividend Implementer comparing choices about 
how to value observations, one could also use these 
simulations to figure out how to induce a specific dividend 
distribution. In other words, an implementer could work 
backwards through the design space, by starting with a 
desirable Disbursement distribution they would like to 
create. In the framework of the growing fairness literature, 
this would be equivalent to allowing for disparate treatment 
to achieve a desired (non-disparate or less-disparate) impact 
[7]. Exploring these types of disparate treatment approaches 
in data dividends is a useful direction of future work.  
Throughout our Results section, we discussed how highly 
unequal data dividend outcomes may be cause for serious 
concern, but also observed that there are a number of 
Observation Valuation choices that can lead to extremely 
equal dividends. Extremely equal outcomes may also 
concern some implementers, given that economists have 
raised concerns around enforced “equality of outcomes” 
(e.g. [31, 65, 75]). This means there may be tension around 
selecting an acceptable level of equality for data dividends. 
It may be possible for data contributors to play a role in 
navigating the design space and providing input on an ideal 
level of inequality for data dividends. One way that such 
collaboration might come about is through collective 
bargaining, i.e. by data unions (or other types of MIDs 
described by Weyl and Lanier [45]).  
Contribution Disparities 
Our results highlight that for one-to-many cardinality 
datasets, the long-tail contribution patterns in user-
generated content that have been well-studied in social 
computing (e.g. [11, 25, 28, 53]) present major challenges 
to using data dividends to mitigate computing-induced 
inequality. This means that any attempt to pay people for 
their data must contest with a very uneven “observation 
contribution playing field”. Our results suggest that the 
issue of contribution disparities, which so far has not been 
highlighted in the data dividend conversations, may need to 
be treated as a central concern. 
To contend with the effect of contribution disparities, data 
dividend implementers may want to consider approaches 
such as introducing diminishing returns (i.e. taxation) or by 
using the “summed influence” approach we explored in our 
simulations (summing the LOO loss changes for each 
contributor). By simulating choices within the design space, 
implementers might create a menu of options which address 
these disparities. 
Data markets may be another viable approach to addressing 
the issues with contributions disparities that we observed – 
providing financial incentives to contribute data might lead 
to a much larger population of heavy data contributors. 
However, data markets are only applicable to data dividend 
implementations with a forward-looking Time Period and 
to types of data which are compatible with a market 
approach (i.e. not implicit behavioral data). 
Beyond Influence Functions 
As we discussed above, we were reliant on influence 
functions to make our simulations possible. However, there 
is ongoing research exploring alternate approaches. Recent 
work from Jia et al. [34, 35] and Ghorbani and Zou [22] 
used the Shapley value [67] for data valuation. The Shapley 
value is the average marginal effect an observation has on 
some outcome (e.g. loss) across all possible combinations 
of data, i.e. the Shapley value accounts for every possible 
“arrival order” of observations. However, in Jia et al.’s 
experiments, influence function-estimated LOO loss change 
was highly correlated with Shapley value and Shapley 
values were still much more expensive to compute than 
influence  [35]. Future work could explore more efficient 
Shapley-based data dividends, perhaps extending 
techniques from Jia et al. [34]. 
Implementers might also seek approaches to account for 
errors in influence functions or related approaches. One 
approach would be to minimize the monetary error 
associated with influence estimation error, i.e. the 
difference between a dividend calculated via true LOO loss 
vs. a dividend calculated via influence estimates. 
Implementers could do so by restricting how unequal 
dividends can become. For instance, under the Binning 
approach we used (above-median gets 2x), if influence 
functions underestimate the influence of a very helpful 
observation by a factor of more than ½, the corresponding 
dividend can at most be reduced by ½. In general, an 
approach that makes dividends more equal (e.g. above-
median gets 1.1x) will further reduce the impact of error.  
Demographic Disparities  
Our results suggest that demographic disparities can 
realistically manifest in data dividends. Adding robustness 
to this critical high-level result, Ghorbani and Zhou also 
identified demographic disparities in their data valuation 
experiments with patient readmission data [22]. 
Under meritocratic approaches to Observation Valuation, a 
contributor’s impact on a model will be dependent on the 
features used in model. In many cases features reflect 
descriptive attributes about a person and elements of a 
person’s identity. Contributors may have no ability to 
modify these features (without lying), let alone interest in 
doing so. Thus, the notion of some data having more 
“merit” than other data becomes questionable. For such 
cases, “meritocratic” Observation Valuation may be poorly 
motivated and create counterproductive outcomes. 
Moreover, the literature on social computing has identified 
many online platforms with demographic contributions 
biases [11, 25, 28, 53]. Thus, using contributions patterns to 
assign payments can also exacerbate existing biases.  
Work on machine learning fairness has highlighted that 
addressing the disparate impacts of intelligent technologies 
is extremely challenging [7], and our results suggest that 
doing so for data dividends may be similarly difficult. 
Regarding concerns around meritocratic Observation 
Valuation, it may be that techniques designed to increase 
the fairness of machine learning models could also improve 
the fairness of related data dividends (e.g. using fairness-
aware models). However, our findings reinforce the need 
for caution and additional research along these lines. 
Nearly Uniform Observation Valuation 
Our results suggest that there is very little difference 
between using LOO loss with a Shift transform and 
assigning each observation the same value. Similarly, in 
studying the Shapley value approach to data valuation, Jia 
et al. provided a theorem stating that for all stable learning 
algorithms, LOO loss can be approximated with bounded 
error by a uniform distribution [35]. Furthermore, Jia et al. 
highlight that “a broad variety of learning algorithms are 
stable” [35].  This means there is a large class of 
technologies for which simple fixed amount per observation 
dividends are almost indistinguishable from estimating 
LOO loss change and applying the Shift transform 
LIMITATIONS 
As emphasized above, this paper was meant to help start the 
process of developing an empirically-grounded decision 
framework for data dividends. By no means does this paper 
finish this process. There are innumerable important 
directions of future work, both in terms of simulations and 
design space articulation.  
With respect to simulations, we examined only 
straightforward transforms, used only a subset of ML 
approaches, and focused only on supervised classification 
(vs. regression, unsupervised learning, etc.) tasks. Valuable 
future work can be done expanding our research in all of 
these directions, in particular considering neural networks. 
In terms of unexplored design dimensions, we did not 
consider in detail regions of the design space that relate to 
forward-looking data dividends and their potential for 
incentivizing data contributions. Future work should also 
consider how this region of the design space relates to the 
large literature on crowdwork marketplaces, although 
existing work in mechanism design provides insight into 
observation valuation for yet-to-be-contributed data, e.g. 
[1]. We do note that our findings related to data valuation 
have implications for future work on data markets – the 
potential for highly unequal distributions and demographic 
disparities likely apply to data markets that use meritocratic 
valuation. We also did not explore design choices that 
involve “data debt” because we did not believe them to be 
ecologically valid for early-stage data dividends. Finally, 
there may design dimensions that have yet to be uncovered. 
Future work should also consider the effect of data 
dividends on national and global inequality, i.e. future data 
dividend simulations should be integrated with 
macroeconomic models. Even if the distribution of 
dividends for a given task is highly unequal, it is still 
possible to reduce income inequality at a high level, e.g. if 
the “superstars” in the highly-unequal data dividends we 
observed are people on the lower end of the income 
distribution. 
CONCLUSION 
Data dividends have been discussed – including by 
prominent politicians – as a way to mitigate inequality 
caused by increasingly intelligent technologies. In this 
paper, we provide an initial exploration of the high-stakes 
design space of data dividends. Using influence function 
techniques from the machine learning interpretability 
literature, we simulate data dividends in a variety of 
contexts. Our results suggest that the outcomes of data 
dividends can be unpredictable, with potentially harmful – 
rather than helpful – effects on inequality. Our results 
highlight the complexity of the data dividend design space 
and the importance of using simulations and careful design 
when implementing data dividends. 
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